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INTRODUCTION: 
RECOGNITION, REDISTRIBUTION AND RECONCILIATION 
IN POSTCOLONIAL SETTLER NATION-STATES
When issues of justice and identity arise in postcolonial settler nation-
states, three major questions stand out. First, should there be recognition 
of special rights for indigenous minorities in postcolonial nation-states? 
Second, how may resources be redistributed to redress longstanding 
indigenous grievances about the history of colonial dispossession? Finally, 
how may reconciliation between the immigrant majority of settlers and their 
descendants take place against a backdrop of multiculturalism? This special 
issue addresses each of these questions, though perhaps not all in equal 
measure. All contributors implicitly or explicitly answer the first question 
in the affirmative, even if answers to the supplementary question of how 
to implement such recognition need to be worked through. Some of the 
contributors directly focus on the second question, but even those who 
do not could argue that recognition is a resource unequally distributed in 
postcolonial nation-states. The third question, which follows from the others, 
is perhaps the key one for all of the contributors. We therefore begin this 
introduction with a reflection on the issue of multiculturalism.
The concept of multiculturalism has dominated debates over justice and 
identity since a Canadian Royal Commission coined it in 1965 (Bennett 
1998:2). It has spread across the globe and is now a key concept in debates 
about the politics of cultural difference and the rights of minorities within 
liberal democratic nation-states. The main reason behind the increasing 
popularity of multiculturalism as a concept, both in political and academic 
arenas, is no doubt intertwined with the globalisation of the world economy, 
and its epiphenomenon of international migration and the resulting crisis 
in the definition of “nation” and “nation-state”. The downside of the rise 
of multiculturalism is the increasing ambiguity of its meaning, considered 
either as a privilege or a perfidy, depending on the context in which it 
is rhetorically deployed. In Canada, for example, it is entrenched in the 
constitution, but its interpretation remains continuously contested, while 
in the United States multiculturalism is typically considered a political 
ideology expressed by “racial” minorities seeking social and economic 
advancement. By the same token, in Australia multiculturalism has played 
an essential role in the nationalist rhetoric espoused by government since 
it liberalised its immigration policy in the 1970s, while in New Zealand 
the concept of multiculturalism has been pronounced unjust by most 
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of the country’s indigenous minority, the Mäori people, because, from 
their perspective, biculturalism logically and chronologically precedes 
the stage of multiculturalism. Mäori opinion leaders generally contest 
multiculturalism on the grounds that it will negate the status of the Mäori 
people as indigenous people and consequently reduce them to a position of 
one among many minorities (Pearson 1995:18-22). 
The ambivalence over multiculturalism has been mirrored in political 
theory, where the term has been received with scepticism from the outset. 
The focus on “culture” in particular has been interpreted as eclipsing more 
fundamental categories of social and political analysis, such as class, gender 
and ethnicity. For this reason, multiculturalism, as it is advocated by the 
governments of some nation-states, e.g., Australia, may be regarded as a 
token policy which avoids the real issues of ethnic and class inequalities 
by focusing on cultural identities and cultural diversity. The entrenchment 
of difference between various social groupings in the multicultural polity 
of modern nation-states implies that egalitarianism is an issue of cultural 
representation rather than of the structural resolution of political and 
economic inequities. This is why in the social sciences multiculturalism is 
generally considered a postcolonial expression of liberal pluralism (Eller 
1997, Turner 1993). The limits of this policy have been particularly evident 
in countries with a significant indigenous minority within their boundaries, 
such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
The point was first made by the American thinker Ronald Dworkin 
(1977) who cogently argued that the so-called “procedural” commitment of 
a liberal society to equality of treatment for all citizens is incompatible with 
a “substantive” commitment to any particular conception of the “good life”, 
because in a democratic polity the latter would be likely to reflect majority 
views at the expense of dissident minorities. Following Dworkin’s view, the 
Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1992) argued that while liberalism 
may seek an equalisation of cultures within the nation-state, indigenous 
minorities demand not only equality but also the recognition of difference, 
including assertions of self-determination and “sovereignty”. Indeed, it is 
one of the most challenging issues in contemporary social theory to find an 
appropriate expression for this dilemma and the way to establish justice for 
indigenous peoples in postcolonial states. 
The essays that follow1 all address this dilemma and discuss various 
strategies to redress longstanding grievances of Aborigines in Australia and 
Mäori in New Zealand. As such, they contribute to the discussion of issues 
that were also the focus of an important recent volume on this topic, entitled 
Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Ivison, Patton and 
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Sanders 2000). In their introduction, the editors of that volume attempted 
to break new conceptual ground by developing new modes of cultural and 
political belonging for indigenous minorities within liberal political theory. 
The assumption underlying this aim was that liberalism is implied in the 
justification of colonialism, which makes it necessary to examine the 
extent to which liberalism could also provide a way for the contemporary 
aspirations of indigenous peoples to seek justice. 
The concept of justice, in this context, is not simply to be understood in 
legal terms. It refers more broadly to the contemporary politics of difference 
in postcolonial nation-states, especially those in which descendants of 
European settlers have over the years come to constitute a majority of 
“outsiders” (Wilson and Yeatman 1995). The democratic polity that they 
have established is invariably founded on the liberal notion that sovereignty 
is indivisible and cannot be shared, and it is precisely this view that is being 
challenged by the claims of indigenous minorities for justice. For a long 
time, this debate on the recognition of indigenous difference and indigenous 
claims to self-government was trapped within the seemingly irreconcilable 
dichotomy between universalism and particularism, between collective 
rights and individual rights (e.g., Messer 1993, Nagengast and Turner 1997, 
Thompson 1997, Turner 1997, Wilson and Hunt 2000). Following Ivison, 
Patton and Sanders (2000:21), however, the articles collected in this issue 
must be situated within the current review of the age-old liberal oppositions 
between universalism and particularism as vantage points on a political 
spectrum within which new forms of coexistence among different peoples, 
indigenous, exogenous and immigrant, must be negotiated. 
All contributions to this issue are based on empirical research within the 
two major settler colonies in the South Pacific, Australia and New Zealand. 
These countries share the fact that they may be considered colonial and 
postcolonial at the same time. They maintain their indigenous populations 
in relationships of dependency on the state, which may be characterised as 
“colonial”, while at the same time they are both former British colonies, but 
gained independence many decades ago (cf. Docker and Fischer 2000:5). In 
addition, they are both settler and immigrant societies, accommodating both 
the descendants of colonial settlers, mainly from Britain, and immigrant 
populations from many different regions in the world, especially southern 
Europe and Asia. In recent decades, immigration also transformed both 
states into nations with multicultural policies, which in turn reinforced 
the peripheral status of the countries’ indigenous minorities, especially in 
Australia. Their indigenous populations’ demands for justice bring to light 
the ambiguous character of both countries. They share a political heritage 
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of a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy, signifying their roots 
in the Old World, and a modernist model of the nation-state. They are, 
however, also distinctly part of the globalised world system, signifying a 
rather postmodern model of nationhood, characterised by fluid boundaries, 
internal diversity, fragmentation and plurality. 
The emergence of Australia and New Zealand as postmodern, multicultural 
and postcolonial nation-states in the South Pacific has given rise to a number 
of burning issues that require resolution. But these issues are so complex 
that instant solutions are not available. First, immigrant groups are now 
presenting themselves in the multicultural arena alongside the countries’ 
indigenous populations, putting forward competing claims for recognition. 
In a project of state justice, their demands surely need to be acknowledged, 
yet they need to be weighed and balanced against the interests of Aborigines 
and Mäori, and at the same time the interests of the majority group of 
settlers’ descendants cannot be neglected either. Second, the postmodern 
dilemma of a multicultural project is compounded by the universalist 
principle that all citizens should be treated equally, regardless of colour, 
ethnicity, gender or religion, which is entrenched in the constitutional 
arrangements of the liberal-democratic nation-states of Australia and New 
Zealand. This very principle is nowadays being reviewed and renegotiated 
as a result of increasing demands for the recognition of difference from both 
indigenous and immigrant minority groups. Third, in postcolonial countries 
such as Australia and New Zealand such postmodern and multicultural 
issues cannot be considered in isolation from the colonial history and the 
continuing legacy of dispossession, disenfranchisement, discrimination 
and oppression, all prompting the inevitability of reconciliation and 
redistribution to redress historical injustices, especially as they relate to 
indigenous minorities.
Over the past decade, these issues have been the subject of much reflection 
and debate. It is not surprising, perhaps, that Canadian philosophers, notably 
Charles Taylor (1992, 1995) and Will Kymlicka (1995, 2000, 2001), 
have made some of the most influential contributions to these debates. 
Canada shares many characteristics with Australia and New Zealand, in 
the sense that it is also a postmodern, multicultural and postcolonial settler 
nation-state. Moreover, it shares with New Zealand an official policy of 
“biculturalism”, albeit one that establishes a relationship between the 
descendants of two different groups of settlers (British and French). The 
indigenous minorities in Canada, however, are culturally and historically 
different from Australian Aborigines and New Zealand Mäori, but the 
scope of Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s work reaches far beyond their country of 
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citizenship. Taylor (1992:26), for example, reminds us that the struggle for 
indigenous recognition has been linked to the concept of identity only since 
the emergence of modern society in the West. He clarifies this argument 
by contrasting modern identity with identity in pre-modern circumstances, 
when it was largely unproblematic because a person’s identity was intricately 
interwoven with her or his social position in the hierarchical structure 
of traditional societies. In pre-modern European society, for example, 
people had recognition for the status they held. Their sense of social self 
was expressed by their rank in society and for that reason, their personal 
identity was not thematised. 
The collapse of the ancien régime, however, resulted not only in a 
new type of society, but also in a new type of identity. Taylor traces the 
intellectual origin of the modern concept of identity to the philosopher 
Georg Friedrich Hegel and his dialectical model of identity through a 
process of mutual recognition. According to Hegel, recognition indicates a 
reciprocal relation between individual subjects, who regard each other as 
both equal and separate. This relation, in turn, is constitutive of individual 
subjectivity: one becomes an individual subject only by virtue of recognising 
and by being recognised by another subject. Recognition from others is 
therefore essential to the development of a sense of self. To be denied 
recognition or to be misrecognised is to suffer both a distortion of one’s 
relation to one’s self and an injury to one’s identity:
our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the 
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real 
damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back 
to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves 
(Taylor 1992:25).
Taylor (1992:38) situates his reflections on the politics of recognition 
in multicultural nation-states against the historical background of the 
development of the modern notion of identity, since in his view this notion 
also explains the rise of the politics of difference. Contemporary claims to 
difference follow from the connection between the modern conceptions of 
identity and the notion of equal dignity. This connection can be traced to 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in whose view respect in modern society replaced 
the focus on honour and shame in traditional hierarchies. According to 
Taylor, however, the valuation of equal dignity in modern society triggers 
a quest for recognition of distinct identities. The universalist import of the 
mission of modern individuals to be recognised for their supposedly unique 
identity, therefore, draws at the same time attention to a tension inherent 
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in the discourse of modern identity. While the principle of equal respect 
requires that people are treated the same regardless of differences, the pursuit 
of dignity simultaneously fosters a demand for particularity. 
The disharmony between these two aspects of modern identity parallels 
the imbalance between individual rights and collective rights and goals in 
liberal theory. In liberal society, individual rights always take precedence 
over collective goals. This position is rooted in the philosophy of Immanual 
Kant, who understood human dignity as founded mainly in the autonomy 
of individuals. As a consequence, the demand for equal dignity has become 
enshrined in the liberal discourse of human rights that, paradoxically, 
renders the demand not amenable to difference, because the same 
discourse insists on a uniform interpretation of these rights. For that 
reason, this discourse considers a society pursuing collective goals by 
definition as violating the rights of the individual to self-expression and 
self-determination. 
The incompatibility of individual rights with their universal application 
and the intolerance of collective goals in liberal discourse have become 
particularly problematic within contemporary, increasingly multicultural, 
societies. Large numbers of people who are citizens of liberal societies, 
either as descendants of invading settler colonists or through migration, 
are also demanding recognition as cultural groupings, sometimes even 
alongside indigenous populations. This development calls into question 
the philosophical emphasis on the individual and her or his rights. The 
challenge is to respond to requests for recognition as separate groups without 
compromising the basic tenets of Western liberalism. The value of equal 
dignity may have contributed to the emancipation of Western individuals, 
but it must not follow that Western judgements of worth contribute to the 
homogenisation of everyone who does not fit within this framework. The 
politics of recognition must not “end up making everyone the same” (Taylor 
1992:71; see Morton in this issue).
Although Taylor’s analysis of the politics of multiculturalism in terms of 
a politics of recognition was very influential in the 1990s, in recent years 
his equation of the demand for recognition with identity politics has been 
criticised. Nancy Fraser (2000), for example, argued that Taylor’s focus on 
identity encourages, first, the reification of group identities and, second, the 
displacement of the need for redistribution. Fraser (2000:112-13) argues 
that the struggle for recognition by cultural minorities across the globe 
cannot be considered in isolation from increasing transnational migration, 
interaction and communication. These global processes lead to creolising, 
hybridising and pluralising cultural forms all over the world, but the 
response towards them does not usually lead to greater understanding. 
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Rather, it fosters the reification and essentialisation of group identities. 
Within multicultural settings, the requirement to develop and show a 
so-called authentic identity for groups and group members puts moral 
pressure on individual members to conform to a given group culture. The 
overall effect is to impose a single, simplified group identity that denies the 
complexity of people’s lives and the multiplicity of their various affiliations 
and identifications. Ironically, therefore, the focus on identity serves as a 
vehicle for misrecognition, since the reification of group identity eclipses 
individual variation and also obscures the struggle within cultural groupings 
for authority and control of representation.
In addition, Fraser (2000:110-12) contends that the discourse of identity 
downplays the call for redistribution of power and resources at a time when 
economic globalisation is radically exacerbating economic inequalities. 
Also, the struggle for recognition as represented by Taylor does not 
effectively supplement the need for redistribution, but marginalises it instead. 
Fraser distinguishes two variations in the displacement of redistribution. 
Misrecognition is either conceived of as a problem of cultural deprivation, 
locating the roots of injustice in demeaning representations and not seeing 
these as politically or economically grounded. Or when cultural injustice is 
linked to economic inequality, mal-distribution is dismissed as a secondary 
effect of misrecognition or an expression of cultural hierarchies. 
To overcome the shortcomings of Taylor’s position on the politics of 
recognition, it is necessary to combine the cultural politics of difference with 
the social and economic politics of equality (Fraser 1995). This follows from 
the two-dimensional predicament of minorities in multicultural nations. 
Minorities face the consequences of socio-economic injustice, rooted in 
the political and economic structure of society. They also face cultural or 
symbolic injustices, rooted in social and cultural patterns of representation, 
interpretation and communication. As a corollary, bivalent groups who 
are affected by both forms of injustice, such as indigenous minorities in 
postcolonial nation-states, submit claims both for redistribution, aimed 
at remedying economic injustice, and claims for recognition, aimed at 
remedying cultural injustice.
The paradox of these mutually reinforcing claims is, however, that the 
politics of redistribution and the politics of recognition appear to have 
mutually contradictory aims. After all, redistribution claims generally call 
for an end to economic arrangements that perpetuate inequality between 
groups, while recognition claims often take the form of calling attention 
to the cultural specificity of the group concerned. Needless to say, this 
dilemma of struggling against the economic discrimination of indigenous 
minorities, while at the same time valorising indigenous cultures and 
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indigenous knowledge systems, parallels the dilemma that appeared to 
be part of liberalism. The principle of equal respect in liberal theory 
requires people be treated equally regardless of cultural differences, which 
paradoxically makes it necessary to recognise and even foster cultural 
particularities in order to avoid the possibility that they may remain 
unacknowledged. In sum, then, the solution proposed by Fraser to the 
double-bind of liberal theory does not resolve the contradictory implications 
of the dilemma between sameness and difference, between redistribution 
and recognition. 
Nancy Fraser (1995, 2000) has made several attempts to tackle this 
challenging dilemma facing contemporary multicultural nations, the 
dilemma that redistributive remedies for political and economic injustice 
invariably collapse distinctions among different groups within nation-states, 
while recognition remedies against cultural and value related injustices 
simultaneously intensify group differentiation. One of her proposals is to 
integrate recognition claims and redistribution claims with a minimum of 
mutual interference. This seems, however, to be too much the product of a 
methodological exercise in her study (Fraser 1995:82-86). Another proposal 
is to treat recognition as related to the social status of individual members of 
minority groups, but this fails to address their demand for collective rights 
(Fraser 2000:113-20). A further problem with Fraser’s narrow political and 
economic approach is that, over the past two decades or so, the discourse 
of indigenous peoples within multicultural nation-states is increasingly 
“culturalised” as well as “judicialised” (see e.g., Sharp 1997:304). The 
complexity of indigenous peoples’ predicament is that their dispossession 
in colonial history not only meant that they lost control and use of their 
land, but it also deprived them of political sovereignty. Furthermore, it has 
contributed to their dislocation and loss of cultural connections, integrity 
and language, while the secondary effects of their dispossession may be 
summed up by poverty, disenfranchisement and subjection. By implication, 
the question of a just response to indigenous peoples’ demand for justice 
ought not to focus exclusively on the distribution of property or on the 
recognition of the value of their culture and way of life, but it should also 
focus on the legitimacy of the state’s sovereignty, on the recognition of 
pre-existing nations with their own system of relations to land and other 
resources. Likewise, an adequate response towards the complexity of these 
problems and a just solution to the deprived status of indigenous minorities 
requires negotiations that enable shared sovereignty or a co-existence 
of indigenous sovereignties and the sovereignty of the multicultural 
nation-state (cf. Dodds 1998). 
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One of the most sophisticated contributions to resolving the classic 
dilemma of “unity in diversity and diversity in unity” in the context of 
relationships between ethnic minorities, particularly indigenous minorities, 
and liberal-democratic, multicultural nation-states is the work of the 
Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka (1995, 2000, 2001). Kymlicka’s 
point of departure is that minority rights cannot be subsumed under the 
category of human rights. Therefore, group-specific rights are necessary to 
accommodate structural differences in cultural orientation and economic 
status between dominant majorities and subordinate minorities. He seeks 
a solution for the dilemma of liberalism in a combination of universal 
rights for individuals, irrespective of their group affiliation, and certain 
group-differentiated rights for ethnic minorities. He recognises that the Nazis 
and other apologists of racial segregation have abused the entrenchment 
of a “special status” for minorities. This is one reason why, he argues, a 
liberal theory of minority rights must not only combine minority rights with 
human rights, but also limit minority rights by the principles of individual 
liberty, democracy and social justice (Kymlicka 1995:6). 
Kymlicka (1995:107-30) considers three types of arguments to substantiate 
his view that indigenous rights to self-determination are consistent with 
and even required by liberal justice. They concern equality, the role of 
historical agreements and the value of cultural diversity. The first argument 
is a critique of the position that individual human rights already allow for 
the accommodation of differences and that genuine equality requires equal 
rights for each individual regardless of ethnic background. He defends 
the contention that group-specific rights are necessary to accommodate 
differences and rather provocatively states that “the accommodation of 
differences is the essence of true equality” (Kymlicka 1995:108). His 
argument here is that indigenous minorities face a loss of culture that they 
cannot reasonably be asked to accept (see also Kirsch 2001). He also refers 
to liberal theories of justice, as developed by Dworkin (1977) for example, 
which pointed out that the protection of indigenous minorities is not 
unfair, but indeed necessary to redress the structural inequities that have 
resulted from the history of colonial settlement. As a consequence, the 
group-differentiated right to self-determination or self-government is 
necessary to compensate for unequal circumstances that put indigenous 
minorities at a systemic disadvantage in the multicultural arena. Genuine 
equality between different groupings in the nation-state does not necessarily 
imply identical treatment. Instead, a special treatment is necessary in 
order to address historical grievances and to accommodate different needs. 
Differential treatment of indigenous minorities is especially important in the 
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political domain. What are the relevant political units within a multicultural 
nation-state? What level of government should make which decision 
for whom? Kymlicka (1995:113) cogently argues that the delineation of 
political boundaries, the division of powers and the official recognition 
of indigenous languages are particularly significant in this respect. In his 
view, there can be no equal standing for indigenous peoples until they are 
acknowledged as equal sovereigns by means of a postcolonial constitutional 
arrangement of these three aspects. 
Kymlicka’s second argument supporting group-differentiated rights for 
indigenous minorities is that these rights are a logical and natural extension 
of historical agreements, such as the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand 
or the famous ruling of the Australian High Court in the Mabo case. This 
ruling rejected the basis for the colonisation of Australia as terra nullius, 
or no man’s land, and as a result urged the dominant majority of settlers 
and immigrants to negotiate a federation with Aborigines. The difference 
between the colonisation of New Zealand and of Australia highlights that the 
incorporation of indigenous minorities in settler colonies invariably gives 
rise to group-differentiated rights (Kymlicka 1995:117). If incorporation 
occurred through a treaty, such as in New Zealand, certain rights are spelled 
out in the treaty. If incorporation was involuntary, such as in Australia, 
indigenous minorities have a claim to self-government under international 
law that makes it necessary for the settler majority to renegotiate the 
nation-state into a voluntary federation. This second historical argument is 
different from the first argument for equality. The question here is not 
how the state should treat its minorities, but the terms under which two 
peoples decide to shape their partnership. The problem with the historical 
argument, however, is that it is often difficult to interpret. By the same 
token, it inevitably needs to be updated and revised. For this reason, 
Kymlicka argues that the historical agreement must be grounded in a 
broader theory of justice that combines the historical argument with the 
equality argument.
Kymlicka’s third and final argument for legitimising special rights 
for indigenous minorities builds on the value of cultural diversity within 
contemporary nation-states. This position differs from the previous two 
arguments by focusing not on the interests and needs of one or more groups, 
but on the intrinsic value of a country encompassing diverse lifestyles. 
Rather than appealing to the settler majority’s obligations towards the 
indigenous minority, as the first two arguments do, this argument appeals 
to the settler majority’s own interests and benefits. The value of cultural 
diversity is that it enriches a society and, even more importantly, that it 
creates more options for each individual member of society. It needs to be 
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acknowledged, however, that cultural diversity does not expand the range 
of options for individual members of the majority in the same way as it 
does for members of the indigenous minority. Because of this, the benefits 
of cultural diversity for national majorities are at best desirable by-products 
of indigenous rights, rather than their primary justification. In this sense, the 
diversity argument supplements, but does not replace, the justice argument 
based on equality or historical agreement. Nevertheless, cultural diversity 
is especially important for non-indigenous, immigrant minorities in 
former settler colonies, as Božic-Vrbancic shows in her contribution 
to this issue. 
The contributions to this special issue can be grouped around the three 
themes of equality, historical agreements and cultural diversity as they are 
distinguished by Kymlicka’s proposition to recognise indigenous rights 
within multicultural societies. The opening paper by Ann Sullivan, a 
political scientist of Mäori descent, ties in with Kymlicka’s argument 
that the notion of equality in liberal-democratic theory does not preclude 
political autonomy of indigenous groups. Indeed, it is his view that political 
autonomy is not only necessary to guarantee justice to indigenous minorities, 
but also to ensure their survival as distinct peoples. Sullivan assesses the 
arguments for separate parliamentary representation of Mäori, introduced 
as early as 1867, on the basis of Article 3 of the Treaty of Waitangi that 
guaranteed Mäori rights of equal citizenship. The special seats for Mäori 
remain a unique feature of the New Zealand parliamentary system. Although 
this form of franchise had little impact on Mäori welfare for the next six 
decades, during the depression in the 1930s Mäori succeeded in using their 
parliamentary representation to secure collective benefits. Nevertheless, it 
did not provide them with access to genuine political influence until the 
introduction of a Multi-Member Proportional voting system in 1996. 
Today all mainstream political parties in New Zealand court the Mäori 
vote and many Mäori now use the electoral system to further their goal of 
self-determination and control over their political, economic, social and 
cultural resources and development. The franchise has become part of the 
struggle to maintain a sense of nationhood, a strong identity, and a unique 
language and culture. Towards the end of her contribution Sullivan does 
qualify the importance she places on parliamentary representation for 
Mäori development, but this caveat only serves to highlight the tensions 
between liberal equality, historical agreements and cultural diversity that 
Kymlicka has outlined.
The following two contributions may be classified under Kymlicka’s 
second argument regarding the implication of historical agreements. John 
Morton addresses the significance of government apologies for historical 
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injustices in the reconciliation between Aborigines and non-Aborigines in 
Australia, while Toon van Meijl analyses the problematic aftermath of the 
settlement of a major Mäori claim in which the recognition of grievances 
was combined with the redistribution of resources. In Australia the process 
of reconciliation, initiated in the late 1980s, has stalled on all fronts. 
Over the past few years, the country’s Prime Minister, John Howard, has 
refused to apologise for past injustices, while he has ruled out a treaty with 
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and also any material reparation for 
their multiply disadvantaged position in Australian society (cf. McIntosh 
2000). As against the “postmodern” view that reconciliation is simply a 
“ritual” denying the possibility of a structural transformation of relations 
between Aborigines and non-Aborigines, Morton restores the power of 
apologies. He argues that the efficacy of reconciliation is often undermined 
by being embedded in a discourse that positions Aborigines and non-
Aborigines in a binary logic of indigenous resistance against postcolonial 
hegemony. Morton shows convincingly that this discourse does not recognise 
the potential of negotiations across a “racial divide” that allows for empathy 
as well as antagonism. An apology for colonial injustices to the Aborigines 
therefore cannot simply be dismissed as an extension of liberal power over 
Aboriginal people. Instead, it must be viewed as an inevitable part of the 
process of coming to terms with the history of dispossession and the resulting 
process of an involuntary federation of two different peoples.
While in Australian politics “symbolic” and “practical” reconciliation 
remain, at least for the time being, rather distinct, in New Zealand recognition 
of Mäori grievances involves a combination of apologies and redistribution 
in most compensation settlements that have been signed between the 
Government and Mäori tribal groups over the past decade. Toon van Meijl 
analyses one such settlement, that of the Tainui Mäori, in some detail. This 
deal included a formal apology from the Crown, acknowledging it acted 
unjustly in dealing with the Tainui Mäori in the 1860s, and it provided for 
the return of three percent of the lands originally confiscated as well as a 
significant cash settlement. In 1995 the British Monarch even travelled to 
New Zealand to sign the act passing into law the agreement signed between 
the Tainui leadership and the New Zealand Government. Within four years, 
however, the Tainui had lost a large amount of their assets while newspapers 
reported almost daily on court cases between different Tainui factions, 
notably a group of administrators and accountants versus representatives 
of the tribal leadership that has been housed in the Mäori King Movement 
since 1858. Van Meijl examines what went wrong after the signing of the 
settlement and the structural causes of the political conflict within the 
Tainui confederation. He shows that any resolution of historical grievances 
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is controversial and may even create new problems. The socio-political 
organisation of Mäori society has changed radically since the 19th century, 
as currently 80 percent of the Mäori population is residing in urban 
environments and missing out on the compensation settlements that the 
Government only negotiates with tribal organisations. In addition, it is also 
unclear within contemporary tribal organisations who the rightful heirs 
of the traditional owners are, since this question is preceded by a more 
fundamental question about the nature of property rights in the 19th century 
that cannot be resolved unambiguously. Needless to say, the practical 
implications of these historical ambivalences are colossal.
The final two contributions to this issue address the argument for the 
importance of cultural diversity in New Zealand contexts. Michael Goldsmith 
analyses the use of the concept of culture in a variety of discourses, while 
Senka Božic-Vrbancic addresses the problematic representation of the 
descendants of Croatian migrants in the displacement of multiculturalism by 
biculturalism. As mentioned above, Mäori people argue that any discourse 
of multiculturalism will enable the Government to neutralise their claims 
for justice under the Treaty of Waitangi in which Mäori rights are embedded 
(Walker 1995). They consider this unjust against the background of the 
colonial history of New Zealand. Mäori have rejected multiculturalism 
so strongly that the state has officially adopted a policy of biculturalism, 
at least in terms of rhetoric, although it is regarded as a necessary stage 
preceding a policy of multiculturalism. Against this background Michael 
Goldsmith examines in particular the forms of what he labels “culturespeak”, 
following a lead from Ulf Hannerz. Surfacing regularly in the discourse 
of New Zealand politicians, authors, academics, journalists, judges and 
laypeople, these forms either constitute or criticise some version of  “culture” 
in order to make identity claims. In either case, the notion of culture at stake 
is generally taken for granted. These rhetorical uses of culture deserve to be 
scrutinised in order to make explicit their ideological scope.
The implications of the displacement of multiculturalism by biculturalism 
in New Zealand are addressed in the contribution by Božic-Vrbancic 
about the cultural contact between Mäori and Croats. In New Zealand the 
descendants of a group of early migrants from the Mediterranean coast in 
Middle Europe are described as “Dalmatians”, an archaic term that is today 
a contested site of identity. In no other country in which migrants from 
Croatia have settled has the name “Dalmatia” as much significance as it has 
in New Zealand, particularly in Northland, mainly as a result of a nostalgic 
construction of intercultural contact between Mäori and Croats on the gum 
fields of the Far North towards the end of the 19th century (Nola 2000). 
Božic’s point of departure is the marginalisation of immigrant minorities 
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in New Zealand who cannot be represented under the umbrella “Päkehä”, 
a term which generally refers to “non-Mäori” but which surreptitiously 
presupposes a homogeneous British culture as the binary opposite to 
Mäori. Her article suggests that the precedence of biculturalism over 
multiculturalism as commanded by Mäori moves peripheral cultural 
groupings completely off-stage. The argument is based on a moving analysis 
of an exhibition in New Zealand’s national museum, proudly presented 
as a celebration of multiculturalism, but, according to Božic, not quite 
a feast for everyone. 
Together the five papers collected in this special issue address the 
complexity of the righteous demand for justice by minorities, notably the 
indigenous peoples of Australia and New Zealand, the Aborigines and 
the Mäori, although Božic reminds us that the just focus on the plight 
of indigenous minorities can never justify the neglect of recognition of 
other cultural groupings, no matter how minor they may seem. This point 
merely highlights the important argument that no one solution is available to 
address the challenges of contemporary liberal-democratic, multicultural, or 
bicultural, nation-states to reach justice and to offer each and everyone the 
opportunity to construct a distinct identity at the same time. 
Toon van Meijl and Michael Goldsmith
